Search results for "Dictator game"
showing 10 items of 16 documents
On Ibn Ezra's Procedure and Shapley Value
2014
We examine ibn Ezra's procedure (Rabinovitch 1973; O'Neill 1982) historically used to solve the Rights Arbitration problem in the general framework of bankruptcy problems. When the greatest claim is larger than or equal to the estate, the procedure is a maximal game (Aumann 2010). However, when the greatest claim is smaller than the estate, the axioms of efficiency (the whole estate is distributed) and satiation are difficult to satisfy simultaneously. We discuss both axioms to show that their importance and necessity are radically different. From then, for the part of the estate not covered by the greatest claim, we examine four possible procedures: the minimal overlap rule, Alcalde et al.…
The effects of personality, risk and other-regarding attitudes on trust and reciprocity
2022
Abstract This paper reports experimental results on the determinants of trust and reciprocity in the context of a genuinely sequential, binary Trust Game. Apart from behavior in the main experiment, subjects’ risk attitudes and inequality aversion are elicited, as well as the traits of neuroticism and agreeableness, captured through the five-factor model. The findings suggest that trustors’ (first movers) behavior is affected by their loss aversion, while trustees’ (second movers) reciprocal behavior is not explained by any of their other-regarding attitudes, but, rather, by their agreeableness.
Coordinated Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation
2015
In this paper, we analyze a team trust game with coordinated Q1 punishment of the allocator by investors and where there is also a final stage of peer punishment. We study the effect of punishment on the reward and the investment decisions, when the effectiveness and cost of coordinated punishment depend on the number of investors adhering to this activity. The interaction takes place in an overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous preferences and incomplete information. The only long-run outcomes of the dynamics are either a fully cooperative culture (FCC) with high levels of trust and cooperation and fair returns or a non-cooperative culture with no cooperation at all. The basin of…
Older and Younger Adults Perform Similarly in an Iterated Trust Game
2021
This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, with pre-doctoral FPU fellowship FPU14/07106 to MT, and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, with research projects PSI2014-52764-P and PSI2017-84926-P to JL. This research is part of MT’s thesis dissertation under the supervision of JL.
Active Learning on Trust and Reciprocity for Undergraduates
2019
We propose a teaching activity aimed at promoting social values, such as trust and reciprocity, among undergraduate students in economics and related degrees. We present our pilot experience of what we call RED&ndash
Believing in Hidden Plots is Associated with Decreased Behavioral Trust: Conspiracy Belief as Greater Sensitivity to Social Threat or Insensitivity T…
2022
Abstract Past research has demonstrated that conspiracy belief is linked to a low level of self-reported general trust. In four experimental online studies (total N = 1105) we examined whether this relationship translated into actual behavior. Specifically, since the decision to trust relies on the ability to detect potential social threat, we tested whether conspiracy believers are better at detecting actual threat, worse at detecting the absence of threat, or simply trust less, irrespective of any social cue. To this end, participants played multiple, independent rounds of the trust game, a behavioral measure for interpersonal trust. We manipulated social threat by presenting photographs …
Reply to Côté and Willer: New replication attempts provide no evidence that inequality moderates the effect of income on generosity
2020
Cote et al. (1) provided evidence that economic inequality moderates the effect of income on generosity. In their study, individuals with higher household income were less generous in a dictator game than poorer individuals only if they resided in a US state with comparatively large economic inequality. We questioned this finding because we did not find any evidence for the postulated moderation effect of economic inequality across three studies (ref. 2; for similar replication failures see ref. 3). However, our studies were conceptual rather than direct replications as we used different measures of generosity (charitable donations, behavior in a trust game, and volunteering) and also inclu…
The paradox of (Inter)net neutrality: An experiment on ex-ante antitrust regulation✰
2022
Abstract Net neutrality has been the most relevant and heavily debated Internet regulation policy of the last decade. Net neutrality aims to prohibit discrimination between data packages in terms of content, origin, destination, or type of equipment used. However, the Big Tech companies, sheltered by the net neutrality policy, have flourished. They now have the power to exclude minor companies, and therefore their contents, from the Internet market in de facto defiance of the net neutrality principle. Academic results regarding this net neutrality paradox are still ambiguous. To represent the current Internet market distortions and analyze a potential tool to adjust and strengthen the net n…
Carry a big stick, or no stick at all
2016
We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, reciprocit…
Trust and punishment
2021
Abstract This paper explores the impact of institutions on the evolution of preferences (culture) and on economic outcomes. Punishment institutions determine the capacity and the individual cost of punishing opportunistic behavior, while preferences are endogenous and can be influenced by a cultural transmission process that is conditioned by the existing punishment institutions. We investigate the interaction and evolution between the preferences for reciprocity or rewarding of the allocator and the preferences to punish hostile behaviour by the investor in a trust game with a costly punishment phase. Our main result provides a rationale for the existence of a strong positive relationship …